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STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
EDWARD D. IRE "
INTRODUCTION

the many legal problems that followed the close of World
O FWar
II, few indeed have been so thoroughly examined,
if not vehemently debated, as those stemming from the stationing of American servicemen on friendly foreign soil. Perhaps no treaty has been so severely criticized as the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement. It has been stated that "this
unprecedented Agreement reflects a callous disregard of the
rights of American Armed Forces personnel," and that it
amounts to "penalizing the American soldier in an effort
to please our NATO allies."' The legal criticism fundamentally stemmed from the belief that "the rule of international
law as laid down by Chief Justice John Marshall [in the
Schooner Exchange case]

. .

.

is that troops of a friendly

nation stationed within the territory of another are not subject
to the local laws of the other country, but are subject only
to their own country's laws and regulations for the government of the armed services . . .
The voices that objected to the approval of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement were not silenced by its ratification by the Senate by a vote of 72 to 12.3 Many patriotic
Americans and organizations continued to clamor for the
abrogation of status of forces arrangements patterned on the
t Member of the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York;
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 99 CONG. REc. 4818, 4819 (daily ed. May 7, 1953) (remarks of Senator
Bricker).
2 Ibid.
399 CONG. REc. 9088 (daily ed. July 15, 1953).
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NATO Status of Forces Agreement.4 Since the objections
were founded upon the conviction that such agreements were
"violative of the rights of American nationals," even the
procedural safeguards, expressly set forth in the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement itself, did not satisfy the critics." Regardless of its provisions, it was felt by those who opposed
the Agreement that America had suffered rather than gained,
since, in the absence of the Agreement, American servicemen
would have been immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the foreign country. It was not maintained that international law could not be changed by mutual agreement, but
rather, that the Agreement in question deprived the American
serviceman of an immunity that he would have otherwise
enjoyed.
It has been shown that under the principles of international law, as gleaned from judicial precedents, the writings7
of publicists and state practice, no such immunity exists.
As indicated by the 'following quotation, it is futile to rely
upon the case of The Schooner Exchange 'v. MoFaddom in
support of the principle of immunity or waiver of territorial
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed
by itself. . . . All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation, within its own territories, must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.8
Clearly, therefore, the general rule is one of territorial
supremacy, and all exceptions thereto "must be traced to the
consent" of the territorial sovereign.
4 See Hearings on H.R. 8704 Before House Committee on Armed Services,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3572 (1957).
5 99 CONG. REc. 9032
(daily ed. July 14, 1953) (remarks of Senator
McCarren).
6See 99 CONG. REc. 9032 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
7See authorities cited in Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and
International Law, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 349 (1955).
sThe Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812). See also Cozart v. Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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The practical observation has been made that, by virtue
of the ratification of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
these interesting legal questions are now merely of academic
interestf It is perfectly true that from a practical standpoint the actual operation of these jurisdictional arrangements within the foreign country is what really matters.
Nevertheless, it ought to be pointed out that since the existing legal precedents did not deal with a more or less permanent
stationing of troops in time of peace, they could not possibly
have authoritatively disposed of the international legal questions involved. Also one ought to mention that it was unfortunate to speak of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
The word "Agreement" tended to give the impression that
an executive agreement or other informal arrangement was
involved rather than a solemn treaty duly ratified by the
Senate. This added to the misunderstanding of servicemen,
their parents and relatives, who were fearful of trials before
foreign criminal courts.
PROCEDURAL AND OTHER SAFEGUARDS

It will be remembered that Paragraph 9 of Article VII
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement contains specific
procedural safeguards that must be accorded an offender
to be tried by the foreign court. In addition to these enumerated safeguards, prior to the ratification of the treaty, the
Senate adopted a Statement or reservation which imposed
certain duties upon American Commanding Officers when a
member of their command was to be tried by a foreign
tribunal. 10 From all this there emerged the "Trial Observer,"
whose function is to report any violation of the guaranties
contained in the relevant international agreements or any
instances of unfairness in the trial before the foreign court."

9 See Schuck, Concurrent Jurisdiction Under the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, 57 COLUm. L. Rv. 355 (1957).
10 For a discussion of the procedural safeguards in Paragraph 9 of Article
VII and the Senate Statement, see Re, The NATO Statits of Forces Agree-

inent and International Law, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 349, 358-62 (1955).
11 For a brief description of the duties of the Trial Observer, see Brown,
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Also, in order to assure competent legal representation, Congress passed a law authorizing the Secretaries of the military
departments to incur expenses incident to the representation
of their personnel before foreign judicial or administrative
tribunals. 1 In addition to these measures designed to gnarantee a fair trial, in the event of a conviction and incarceration in a foreign jail, a Department of Defense directive
provides for periodic visits by a representative of the armed
3
forces.'
The foregoing safeguards, both legal and moral, refute the
charge that these agreements reflect a "callous disregard of
the rights of American Armed Forces personnel." In the
words of Professor Baxter, "the United States does all
the American serviceman who is tried
that it can to protect
14
in a foreign court."
THE OPERATION OF THE AGREEMENT

Have these jurisdictional arrangements been implemented
in the spirit of cooperation that was envisaged by their draftsmen and proponents?
A sufficient length of time has elapsed to permit a fair
and objective evaluation of their actual operation. Have they
operated satisfactorily? The question is designed to ascertain
whether American servicemen tried by foreign courts have
been treated with justice and fairness.
If this question were to be summarily answered, it would
be perfectly accurate to state that both the annual reports
of the Department of Defense to the United States Senate 15
Functionof the Trial Observer Under the NATO Status of Forces and Other
InternationalAgreements, 1957 JAG J. 9.
1270 Stat. 630 (1956), signed by the President and effective on July 24,
1956. The law was designed to protect American personnel against possible
disadvantages which might have arisen as a result of the unfamiliarity with
local laws, customs and language.
13 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIcTIWvE No. 5525.1, November 3, 1955.
14 Baxter, Criinaml Jurisdiction it the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
A.B.A. SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIvE LAW 61, 65 (1957).
Is For the latest see Hearing Before a Senate Subcommittee of the Coinmittee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960). See also REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERvIcEs, SENATE SUBcomMITIEE ON THE
OPERATION OF ARTICLE VII OF THE NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 2

(1960).
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and private investigations in the field16 reveal that the
criminal jurisdictional arrangements concerning American
servicemen abroad have operated satisfactorily, and that they
have not adversely affected either the morale or the discipline
of the American forces. It follows clearly that they have not
had a detrimental effect on the accomplishment of the important United States military mission in the various countries.
Many of the original fears about the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement and similar treaties were founded on the
belief that American servicemen would not receive what the
American considers "due process of law," and that certain
countries imposed cruel and unusual punishments. The significant inquiry, therefore, deals with the results of those
trials involving American personnel. In this important respect, the following statement from House Report No. 2213,
25 May 1956, Union Calendar No. 825 of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, relative to the Mutual Security Act of 1956,
is reassuring and bears repetition:
The hearings did not bring to light a single instance where it is
claimed that an American serviceman believed to be innocent has
been imprisoned by a foreign court, or an American sentenced for
an act which in the United States would not be considered a crime.
Neither has any case of mutilation, flogging or any other cruel,
unusual, or excessive punishment been cited.
In 1956 Father Snee and Professor Pye, of the Georgetown Law Center, made a field study of the actual operation
of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in
France, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. This study
reached the following conclusions:
From our study of the case material and our discussions with
the men working in the field, we believe that the trials of American
military personnel in the four countries visited are conducted fairly
and impartially. The few cases in which we disagreed with the
result reached were, in our opinion, marginal cases. In no case
studied did we feel that the fundamental rights of any serviceman
were violated, or that procedures were followed or results were

16 See,

e.g., SNFE & PYE,

JURISDICrION

(1957).

STATUS

OF FORCES AGREEMENT AND CRIMINAL

1961)

CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

reached which were such as to shock the conscience or offend against
a concept of ordered liberty.' 7
A study of the testimony, reports and other materials
submitted to Congress reveals unmistakably that these treaties
have worked well in practice.'
These documents will also
reveal that the Department of Defense has adhered strictly
to the policy of protecting "to the maximum extent possible
the rights of United States personnel who may be subject
to criminal trial by foreign courts. . .

.,

19

The reports of the Department of Defense on the operation of the criminal jurisdictional arrangements throughout
the world, submitted annually to a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, summarize the
American experience and set forth the relevant statistical
data. In the most recent hearing before the Subcommittee,
the Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Defense stated that "our experience under these agreements continues to be generally satisfactory." 20 Predicated upon
the testimony, statements, and statistical exhibits submitted,
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, on June
29, 1960, published its most recent Report. This Report,
made by its Subcommittee on the operation of Article VII
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, declared its view
of the operation of these agreements as follows:
It is the view of the subcommittee that generally the criminal

jurisdictional arrangements regarding United States troops abroad
have operated satisfactorily and have not adversely affected during the
reporting period the morale and discipline of our forces, nor have
27 SNEE & PYE, STATUS
DICTION 124 (1957).

OF FORCES AGREEMENT AND

CRIMINAL JuRIS-

is See, for example, Statement of Monroe Leigh, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense, in Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of
Forces Treaty, Hearing Before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1956).
'9
2 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIREcTIvE No. 5525.1, November 3, 1955.
9Hearing Before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960) to review, for the period December
1, 1958, through November 30, 1959, the operation of Article VII of the
agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, together with
the other criminal jurisdictional arrangements throughout the world.
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they had a detrimental effect on the accomplishment of our military
missions in the various countries.2 1
It is interesting to note that the Report states at the
outset that the subcommittee did not consider the constitutionality of the treaty. Moreover, the subcommittee made no attempt to determine whether it is wise or unwise, as a matter
of national policy, for the United States to enter into reciprocal arrangements which recognize the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of foreign countries where United States
troops are stationed. The Report adds that any "re-examination of the broad policy questions would properly come before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." 22
STATISTICAL

DATA

OF OFFENSES

The Report contains the statistics regarding offenses
subject to foreign jurisdiction and their disposition, for the
year ending November 30, 1959, on both a NATO and a
world-wide basis. World-wide, there were 12,909 cases subject to foreign jurisdiction, of which 7,745 were in NATO
countries. In 62.43% of the world-wide total, jurisdiction
of the receiving state was waived, as compared with waivers
in 58.37% of the NATO cases. However, the NATO figure
was higher by 1.6% than in the preceding year, although
the overall percentage of waivers had decreased slightly. It
is interesting to note that jurisdiction of Japanese courts
was waived in 96.31% of the 3,580 cases involved.
In interpreting the statistical data submitted, it is significant to note the high degree to which the traffic cases constitute the offenses subject to foreign jurisdiction. Of the
12,909 offenses world-wide, 9,335 were traffic violations. In
the NATO countries, of the 7,745 offenses, 5,914 were traffic
violations. World-wide, of the 4,070 trials of Americans,
2,720 were for traffic violations.

21 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ON THE OPERATION OF ARTICLE
MENT 2 (1960).
22

Ibid.

VII
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NATO STATUS OF

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE
FORcEs AGREE-

1961]

CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

Of the 4,070 cases tried in foreign courts throughout the
world, 214 resulted in acquittal, 3,608 in fine or reprimand
only, 148 in suspended sentences of confinement, and 100 (or
2.45%) in confinement. Of the 2,740 cases tried in foreign
NATO tribunals, 114 resulted in acquittal, 2,485 in fine or
reprimand only, 90 in suspended sentences of confinement,
and 51 (or 1.86%) in confinement. Since the various effective dates of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement
(through November 30, 1959), of 39,827 cases subject to
jurisdiction in foreign NATO courts, 15,107 were trieda waiver rate of just over 62%. There was actual confinement of 389 persons, or 2.57% of those tried. On a
world-wide basis for a comparable period of time, of a total
of 72,598 cases, 69.19% were waived. Sentences of confinement, not suspended, resulted in 2.79%r of the cases tried.
Later statistics are now being prepared by the Department of Defense, but will not be released prior to their
submission to the Senate Subcommittee. It is anticipated
that figures for the year ending November 30, 1960 will be
available in a report to be issued in June of 1961. It is
anticipated that the most noticeable difference in the statistics
of the new reporting period, as compared with previous
years, will be in the low number of United States personnel
confined in foreign penal institutions pursuant to sentences in
foreign courts. The latest published figures show a total of
73 Americans confined on November 30, 1959. As of February 28, 1961, the total had been reduced to 49, distributed
as follows: 2 in Bermuda, 1 in Canada, 10 in France, 1 in
Italy, 26 in Japan, 1 in New Zealand, and 8 in the United
Kingdom.
It is expected that the new figures will show no significant
change in the waiver rate, although there has been an increase in foreign trials of United States dependents and
civilian employees, as a result of the much publicized decisions
of our Supreme Court which held unconstitutional the trial
of such persons by courts-martial.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
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Court-MartialJurisdiction Over Dependents and
Civilian Employees.

In 1956, in the cases of Reid v. Covert 23 and Kinsella v.
Kruege, 24 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the court-martial convictions of Mrs. Clarice Covert, for the
murder in England of her husband, an Air Force sergeant,
and Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith, for the murder in Japan
of her husband, an Army colonel. Both defendants were
dependents who had accompanied their husbands, armed
forces personnel, abroad. After a rehearing, in an historic
decision rendered on June 10, 1957,25 the -Court reversed
itself and ordered Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith released from
custody. The Court held that Article 2(11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, providing for the trial by courtmartial of persons accompanying the armed forces of the
United States in foreign countries, cannot, in capital cases,
be constitutionally applied to the trial of civilian dependents
accompanying members of the armed forces overseas in time
of peace. In acting against its citizens abroad, said the
Court, the United States can act only within the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, including Article III, paragraph
2, and the fifth and sixth amendments; and no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer on Congress, or any other
branch of the government, power which is free of the restraints
of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, courts of law
alone are given power to try civilians for offenses against the
United States.
The effect of these decisions was broadened on January
18, 1960- by other decisions of the Supreme Court. Grisham
v. Hagan 26 involved a civilian employee of our armed forces
in France, convicted by court-martial of murder. The Court
held that civilian employees could no more be tried by court-

23351 U.S. 487 (1956).
24351

U.S. 470 (1956).

25 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
26361 U.S. 278 (1960).

1 (1957).
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martial for capital offenses than could dependents, and, therefore, on the authority of Reid v. Covert, reversed a lower
court decision which had denied a writ of habeas corpus.
In Kinsella v. United States eco rel. Singleton,2 7 the Court
held that no distinction could be drawn in these cases between capital and noncapital offenses. An Army private
named Dial, and his wife, had been convicted by courtmartial in Germany for involuntary manslaughter in the death
of one of their children. The court-martial conviction of
Mrs. Dial, a dependent accompanying a member of the
armed forces abroad, for this noncapital offense, was held to
be unconstitutional.
Finally, in MeElroy v. United States ex rel. Giuagliardo28
and Wilson v. Bohlender, the Court considered the cases of
two civilian employees convicted by courts-martial of noncapital offenses-one in Morocco for larceny, and the other
in Berlin for sodomy. As had been true of capital offenses,
the Court held that no distinction could be drawn between
dependents and civilian employees convicted by courts-martial
of noncapital offenses. All are unconstitutional.
It will be noted that all of these cases questioned the
constitutionality of provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, rather than the jurisdictional arrangement involved.
As to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the law is now
clear. A provision which would give to the United States,
as sending state, either exclusive or primary jurisdiction
over an offense committed abroad by a dependent or civilian
employee, does not authorize trial by courts-martial in view
of the constitutional limitations upon the use of courtsmartial. Nor can waiver of its primary jurisdiction over
an offense by a receiving state, under the terms of a
Status of Forces Agreement, permit an otherwise unconstitutional trial by court-martial. As a result, a receiving
state having primary jurisdiction in such a case will not be
inclined to waive it; nor will our government be either in27361

U.S. 234 (1960).

28361 U.S. 281 (1960).
Bohlender.)

(This case was heard together with Wilson v.
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clined or justified in requesting a waiver. Rather, a waiver
is to be expected where the primary jurisdiction is ours.
The Supreme Court decisions holding that civilian employees and dependents are not subject to trial by courtmartial in times of peace have raised complex problems for the
executive branch. Since the decisions are based on constitutional grounds, it is beyond the power of Congress to cure the
situation by legislation insofar as trial by court-martial is concerned. All of the alternatives to the trial of such personnel
by court-martial involve the most complex substantive and
procedural problems, ranging from a constitutional amendment to overseas trials before special American tribunals.
Apart from administrative sanctions for relatively minor offenses, no practical alternative has been found other than
trial by the foreign courts. Commenting on this "only practical alternative," Snee and Pye assert that the Supreme
Court "for all practical purposes denied to the overseas dependents the possibility of trial by any American court, even

a court-martial!"

29

It may be added that this is what might have been expected in the absence of a Status of Forces Agreement. The
fact that the particular Agreement cannot, by virtue of our
own Constitution, transfer jurisdiction to an American courtmartial, is certainly no ground for adverse criticism of the
Agreement.
(2)

Constitutionality of the Status of Forces Agreement the Girard Case.

The constitutionality of a provision of a Status of Forces
Agreement was called directly into question in a case which
drew even wider public notice than those which have been
30
mentioned-the case of Wilson v. Girard.
Girard was an
Army sergeant stationed in Japan. He was confined by
United States military authorities for the purpose of being
delivered to the Japanese authorities for trial for the killing
29 SNEE &

PyF, STAT US

DICrIOm 44 (1957).
30354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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of a Japanese while, according to United States authorities,
on official duty. The Japanese contended that the act was
not done on official duty, and that the primary jurisdiction
rested with them, as receiving state, rather than with us.
A Joint Committee was unable to agree on this question,
and referred the matter to higher authority, whereupon the
United States waived whatever jurisdiction it might have had
over the offense.
Girard petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
contending that the Japanese had no jurisdiction over the
offense, and that his detention, for purpose of delivery to the
Japanese for trial, was illegal. On June 18, 1957, the district
court found the act to have been performed on official duty,
giving primary jurisdiction to the United States, which waived
it. The question was then posed whether Girard had a constitutional right to trial by an appropriate American tribunal,
which right would have been violated were he to be delivered
for trial to the Japanese. The district court answered the
question in the affirmative and held that to deliver Girard
for trial to the Japanese would violate his constitutional
rights. The court consequently enjoined the military authorities from delivering Girard to the Japanese. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus, however, was denied, inasmuch as Girard was still a member of the armed forces
and was subject to trial by court-martial for the same offense. 31
On July 11, 1957, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment granting the injunction and affirmed the denial of the
writ of habeas corpus. After going into the history of the
Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, the Court found
that the United States and Japan had signed a Security
Treaty on September 8, 1951, which was ratified by the Senate
on March 20, 1952, and proclaimed by the President to be
effective April 28, 1952. Article III of this treaty authorized
the making of Administrative Agreements concerning United
States armed forces in Japan. On February 28, 1952, the
two nations signed such an Administrative Agreement on
31 Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1957).
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jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan, with a provision permitting waiver by the state having primary jurisdiction. This Agreement was to become effective on the
same day as the treaty, and was considered by the United
States Senate before it gave its consent to the treaty by its
ratification. The Agreement also provided that upon the
coming into effect of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
which had been signed on June 19, 1951, the United States
and Japan would conclude a similar agreement on criminal
jurisdiction. The NATO Agreement became effective August
23, 1953; and on September 29, 1953 the United States and
Japan signed a Protocol Agreement embodying the NATO
provisions, effective October 29, 1953. The Supreme Court
held that, in approving the Security Treaty, the Senate authorized the making of the Administrative Agreement and
the Protocol.
Citing the The Schooner Exchange case for the proposition that "A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to
punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender of its
jurisdiction," the Court held that Japan's cession to the United
States of jurisdiction to try American military personnel
for offenses against the laws of both countries was conditioned by the covenant that the state with primary jurisdiction would give sympathetic consideration to the request of
the other state for waiver. Addressing itself squarely to the
issue whether the carrying out of this provision, authorized
by the treaty, for waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted
by Japan, was prohibited by the Constitution or legislation
subsequent to the treaty, the Court held that there was no
constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision. In the
absence of encroachment upon constitutional rights, said the
Court, "the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the
determination of the Legislative and Executive Branches."
The Court thus upheld the constitutionality of a waiver of
primary jurisdiction by the United States under the Agreement, and, by implication, sustained the constitutionality of
the Status of Forces Agreement.

19611
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AND SPECIAL

PROBLEMS

Notwithstanding the rare exceptional case that is newsworthy because it is essentially an oddity, any impartial examination of the literature and documents will demonstrate
that these agreements have worked well. In this connection,
one may repeat with complete accuracy the statement made
by Senator Wiley, who, referring to the bilateral arrangements subsequent to World War II and before NATO, said
that "our experience with these countries with respect to
this problem has been good." 32 This, of course, does not
mean that special problems have not arisen.
In this latter category may be placed our experience in
Turkey. Because of the substantial difference between the
official rate and the free rate of exchange for Turkish lire,
certain "black-market" activities had led to arrests and trials
of American servicemen by the Turkish courts. While the
Agreement has worked well in Turkey and excellent community relations exist between American personnel and the
Turkish people, the length of Turkish trial proceedings has
caused disturbing problems. To the American it is difficult
indeed to understand that under standard Turkish criminal
procedure, trials are carried on in numerous intermittent
hearings-that may possibly continue for a year. Although
this practice is not peculiar to Turkish law, little comfort is
derived by the serviceman who, as a result, is retained in
Turkey after his normal rotation date. Although the results
have been just, repeated efforts have nevertheless been made
through the State Department to accelerate such trials when
American servicemen are involved. Also, although discussions during this past year indicate that a solution may be
at hand, another disturbing factor has been the reluctance
of the Turkish government to waive its primary jurisdiction
over offenses committed by American servicemen.
Another problem relates to the practice of permitting the
prosecution to take an appeal after an acquittal by the trial
court. Although this procedure is not unusual, and exists in

32

99

CoNG.

REc. 9030 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 35

Japan, France and Turkey, it is repugnant to the American
legal mind. For example, although the Japanese Constitution expressly prohibits double jeopardy, under their system
of law a person is not twice put in jeopardy until all of the
appellate proceedings have been concluded. It can only be
said in this connection that, in those countries where this
procedure exists, the American authorities are doing everything possible to minimize its adverse effects.
Special reference must be made to the situation in Iran.
The United States has no jurisdictional arrangement in Iran,
and of the eight cases that arose in the year ending November
30, 1959, no waivers of jurisdiction were granted by the Iranian authorities. The American commanders in Iran report
that the lack of a jurisdictional agreement with Iran has had
an adverse effect upon the morale of their commands. At this
juncture, it is well to mention that although there is now
a Status of Forces Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany,3 3 prior thereto, the uncertainty as to the authority
to exercise jurisdiction over civilians produced disturbing results upon both morale and discipline. This uncertainty has
now been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States
by its holdings that civilians cannot be tried by courtsmartial.
A deficiency of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
also present in the Japanese Administrative Agreement, which
gave rise to the dispute in the Girard case, is the absence of
a clause which provides who shall determine whether a particular offense arose out of the performance of official duty.
The "Supplementary Agreement" signed on 3 August 1959
with the Federal Republic of Germany provides that this
determination shall be made in accordance with the law of
the sending state. It also provides that the German court or
authority "shall make its decision in conformity with" the
certificate of the military authorities.
In effect, therefore, the German authorities, in the first
instance, accept the military certificate as conclusive. It is
33See A.B.A. SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS 99, 132 (1960).
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conclusive only in the first instance because it is also provided
that in exceptional cases the certificate may be made, at the
request of the German court or authority, the subject of
review through the medium of discussions between the United
States embassy and the Federal Republic of Germany. In
conclusion, it may be added that this "Supplementary Agreement" is more favorable to the United States than the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement.
One additional matter ought to be mentioned, even though
it does not deal with the operation of any jurisdictional arrangement. The Department of Defense has reported that the
statutory authority to pay counsel fees, court costs, bail
and other expenses incident to the representation before
foreign courts, has been of great assistance in assuring servicemen competent representation and the protection of their
legal rights. In view of the Supreme Court decisions previously discussed herein, civilians, not being subject to
military law, are no longer entitled to the benefits of that law.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, certain conclusions stand out in bold
relief. Even the most stern critics would have to admit that
none of the outrageous situations originally conjured up have
actually occurred. Naturally, many difficult and some unanticipated questions were presented. 34 All the reports and
statements of responsible a uthorities, however, reveal beyond
any doubt that the agreements have worked "very satisfactorily," 3r that prisoners have been treated fairly, and that there
has been "no evidence of abuse or mistreatment." 36 Indeed,
the recent reports indicate that whereas the existence of an
agreement does not adversely affect morale or the accomplish34 A good example is the Whitley case dealing with -the effect of waiver

or non-action. Aitchison v. Whitley, 43 REvUE CRITIQUE Dz DRoIr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 602 (1954).
Schuck, Concurrent Jurisdiction Under the
NATO Status of ForcesAgreement, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 355 (1957).
35 See Hearitijs Before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
36 See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVicES, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. - (July 12, 1956).
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ment of the mission, the absence of an agreement does have
an adverse effect upon morale and the accomplishment of
the mission.
Those who envisaged nothing but difficulties and injustices
will find the following words of the Assistant General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, recently told to a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, most reassuring: "I believe it evident that, with hundreds of thousands of U. S. Servicemen, civilian employees and dependents
abroad, we are bound to experience difficult and continuing
problems. .. . However, it can be said in all fairness that
our operations under the NATO Status of Forces Treaty
and similar agreements, continue to be workable and
satisfactory." 3
If additional reassurance is required, one ought to note
the statement of Senator Ervin that "as a general rule, the
punishment meted out to American military and naval personnel by the foreign courts has been substantially less than
the punishment which would probably be meted out in similar
cases in American courts." 38
The legal and practical conclusion has been made that
these agreements "contain express provisions, which go beyond the minimum requirements of international law, to
assure fair trials." 39 When to this is added the statement
of the President of the United States that "the maintenance
of U. S. military strength in Europe is essential to the security of the Atlantic community and the free world as a
whole," 40 both the benefit and importance of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement become too obvious to question.

37 Hearing Before a Senate Subconmittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1960).
38 Ibid.
39 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE AssOCIATIoN OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Report on Status of Forces Agreements 21-22

(1958).
40 President John F. Kennedy, in message to the NATO Council in Paris,
February 16, 1961.

